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NOTE
DEFINING AMBIGUITY IN BROKEN
STATUTORY FRAMEWORKS AND ITS
LIMITS ON AGENCY ACTION
Amanda Urban*
ABSTRACT
“The Problem” occurs when a statute’s provisions become contradictory or
unworkable in the context of new or unforeseen phenomena, yet the statute man-
dates agency action.  The application of an unambiguous statutory provision may
become problematic or unclear.  Similarly, unambiguous provisions may become
inconsistent given a particular application of the statute.  During the same term,
in Scialabba and UARG, the Supreme Court performed a Chevron review of
agency interpretations of statutes facing three variations of the Problem, which
this Note characterizes as direct conflict, internal inconsistency, and un-
workability.  In each case, the Court defined ambiguity in various, nontraditional
ways and deferred to the agency’s reasonable interpretation of the statute.
The broadest definition of ambiguity provided by the Justices encompassed
direct conflicts, internal inconsistencies, and unworkability.  In contrast, the nar-
rowest definition found ambiguity based only on internal inconsistency.  Some
Justices found no ambiguity, but allowed an agency more interpretive flexibility to
resolve the Problem and accomplish the unambiguous mandate of the statute.
This Note contends that ambiguity in broken statutory frameworks may in-
fluence the traditional Chevron analysis; the Court may defer to an agency’s
reasonable interpretation or allow an agency greater interpretive flexibility where
it would not otherwise.  But an agency does not have unlimited interpretive
authority each time the Problem arises.  Agency interpretations that alter or ig-
nore unambiguous statutory text or functionally change the statute may still be
impermissible under Chevron review.  This Note raises agencies’ awareness re-
garding these nontraditional definitions of Chevron ambiguity, and discusses
agency interpretive authority and limitations in the context of the Problem.
* Amanda Urban (University of Michigan, J.D., 2015, B.A., 2012) is a judicial law clerk
to Chief Justice Stephen J. Markman of the Michigan Supreme Court.  She would like to
thank the staff of the Michigan Journal of Environmental and Administrative Law for their
tireless efforts, and her professional mentors, professors, and colleagues for their editorial
assistance and comments on prior drafts of this Note.  The views and opinions set forth in
this Note are the personal views and opinions of the author and do not reflect the views or
opinions of her employer.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Under the Chevron doctrine, a court will defer to an agency’s reasonable
interpretation of a statute an agency administers, provided that the statute
is silent or ambiguous concerning the relevant issue.1  Unfortunately, the
Chevron doctrine leaves confusion as to the meaning of ambiguity and the
limits of reasonableness.  Some scholars posit that the Supreme Court’s
Chevron analyses track political party differences.2  Similarly, skeptics of the
doctrine suggest that Chevron can be manipulated to support either side in
any given case.3  Others argue that the Chevron confusion stems from its
1. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
2. Jack M. Beerman, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed
and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 839 (2010).
3. See Adam Babich, Fun with Administrative Law: A Game for Lawyers and Judges, 4
MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 341, 348, 353 (2015) (stating that administrative law under
Chevron is a language game used to reach an intended result).
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multi-step analysis and that it should be collapsed into a single step.4  Yet,
some defend the doctrine, arguing that it operates under a consensus of core
rationales.5  This Note builds on previous literature by examining ambiguity
within the context of an increasingly common circumstance: broken statu-
tory frameworks.6
Broken statutory frameworks arise when the implementation of a statu-
tory program is unworkable or statutory provisions seem inconsistent be-
cause of an unforeseen phenomenon.7  For example, broken statutory
frameworks are common in environmental law.  Many federal environmen-
tal laws were passed in the 1970s, and although Congress has occasionally
updated these laws in the intervening decades,8 today’s environmental
problems differ from those of past decades.  The U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and other envi-
ronmental regulatory agencies struggle to apply old statutory frameworks to
new environmental concerns that surface as a result of evolving scientific
knowledge.9  Changes in scientific understanding complicate agencies’ ad-
ministration of the programs created by these decades-old statutes.10  Bro-
4. Marianne Kunz Shanor, Administrative Law – The Supreme Court’s Impingement of
Chevron’s Two-Step; Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498 (2009), 10 WYO. L. REV.
537, 537–38 (2010).
5. See, e.g., Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1275 (2008).
6. See Ann E. Carlson & Megan M. Herzog, Text in Context: The Fate of Emergent
Climate Regulation After UARG and EME Homer, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 23, 30 (2015)
(suggesting two possible Chevron deference approaches on the Supreme Court regarding
agency interpretive authority in the context of the Clean Power Plan); see also Brenden
Cline, Comment, Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 275, 275 (2015)
(suggesting that the Court’s Chevron analysis in Scialabba can be applied to predict the
Court’s outcome in its review of the EPA’s Clean Power Plan rulemaking).
7. Cf. Jorge E. Vinuales, Legal Techniques for Dealing with Scientific Uncertainty in Envi-
ronmental Law, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 437, 439 (2010) (discussing the effect scientific
uncertainty over emerging environmental problems has on formulating international envi-
ronmental law).
8. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601–9675 (1980) (amended 1986); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901–6992k (1976) (amended 1984); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388 (1972)
(amended 1981 and 1987); National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331–4370m-12
(1970) (amended 1975 and 1982); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7515 (1963) (amended
1970, 1977 and 1990).
9. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (addressing EPA’s interpre-
tation of the Clean Water Act’s term “navigable waters” in light of emerging hydrological
scientific knowledge).
10. See Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 3 (2014) (describing how federal agencies encounter problems of “fit” with older
statutes); cf. Kirsten Engel & Jonathan Overpeck, Adaptation and the Courtroom: Judging Cli-
mate Science, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 1, 4, 10–11, 25–26 (2013) (stating that climate
change litigation has been dominated by challenges to agency action (or failure to act) in
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ken statutory frameworks become more problematic when a statute compels
agency action—what this Note calls “the Problem.”
The Problem occurs when statutory provisions become contradictory or
unworkable in the context of new or unforeseen phenomena, yet the statute
requires agency action.11  In other words, while the text of the command
may be unambiguous, its application is unclear in light of new circum-
stances.  Without legislative action, an agency must innovate to accomplish
its statutory mandate; otherwise, it may face litigation.12  Furthermore, an
agency must abide by judicial standards for administrative action while do-
ing so, namely Chevron.13  The definition of ambiguity is central to the
Chevron analysis because, absent ambiguity, an agency has no chance of re-
ceiving deference from the court.14  If ambiguity exists, the focus shifts to
an agency’s action and whether it is based on a reasonable reading of the
statute.15
Whether a statutory provision is ambiguous is traditionally determined
by whether its text is clear, but ambiguity may be assessed differently
within the context of broken statutory frameworks.  This Note addresses
various definitions of ambiguity applied by the Supreme Court in the con-
text of the interpretive challenge posed by the Problem in two cases from
the 2014 Term: Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio16 and Utility Air Regulatory
Group v. EPA (UARG).17  Between Scialabba and UARG, six Justices au-
thored opinions conducting Chevron review of three broken statutory
frameworks — (1) direct statutory conflict; (2) internal inconsistency; and
(3) unworkability.  The six opinions from these cases recognized various
definitions of ambiguity and highlighted agency actions that the Justices
found impermissible even in light of the Problem.  The Justices’ definitions
of ambiguity in the exemplary cases are only illustrative—each Justice’s
addressing climate change, arguing that the rapid pace of new discoveries in climate change
science complicates judges’ abilities to evaluate the merits of legal claims and judges should
afford further “technical expertise deference” to agencies in climate change actions than the
more general Chevron deference principle).
11. See Freeman & Spence, supra note 10.
12. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (involving a law suit by several
states against EPA for its failure to take regulatory action over GHGs as required by man-
dates under the CAA).
13. In general agency action is subject to “arbitrary and capricious” review under the
APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A), but Chevron deference is applicable when an agency interprets a
statute that it administers. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837,
837, 842–45 (1984).
14. Id. at 837, 842–43 (1984).
15. See id. at 842–45.
16. Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014).
17. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
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Chevron application varies by case.18  The definitions featured are not com-
prehensive because this Note does not address every statutory challenge an
agency may encounter due to the Problem, or every action an agency might
take as a result.  But this Note recognizes that the nontraditional definition
of ambiguity in broken statutory frameworks may bring new meaning to the
Chevron analysis.  Where a statute containing an unambiguous command is
internally inconsistent or unworkable due to changed circumstances, courts
may be more likely to defer to an agency’s interpretation or allow an agency
greater interpretive flexibility.  This Note also recognizes that the Court has
already suggested some boundaries in this new area of Chevron ambiguity;
an agency cannot alter or ignore explicit statutory text or functionally
change the statute through its interpretation.19
This Note evaluates various definitions of ambiguity in the context of
broken statutory frameworks to provide some insight to agencies and lower
courts in interpreting the bounds of ambiguity within the Problem.  Section
II provides a brief background of the Chevron doctrine.  Section III reviews
the cases Scialabba and UARG, which showcase how the Court has defined
ambiguity when confronted with statutory complications, including circum-
stances where Justices have withheld deference despite recognizing the
Problem.  Section IV analyzes the splintered opinions from UARG and
Scialabba to illuminate the differences among the two cases’ various defini-
tions of ambiguity.  Section V identifies and discusses agency actions that
the Court has held were impermissible even in light of the Problem.
II. THE BASICS OF CHEVRON
In Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,20 the Supreme
Court established a doctrine requiring courts to defer to reasonable agency
statutory interpretations and actions if Congress delegated authority over
the relevant subject to the agency.21  The Court reasoned that Congress
sometimes delegates authority to an agency to craft the details of a statutory
program,22 and that in those instances, courts should defer to the agency’s
action as long as it is within the limits of the delegation because agencies
are part of a political branch tasked with making policy choices, while courts
18. In addition, the new appointee to the Court may have a different perspective from
those discussed in this Note and those espoused by the late Justice Antonin Scalia.  The most
recent nominee certainly does. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th
Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
19. Infra Section V.
20. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
21. Id. at 843–44.
22. Id. at 865.
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are not.23  In determining whether Congress has delegated such power to an
agency, the Court developed a two-step test, now known as Chevron
review.24
At Chevron Step One, the court decides whether Congress has evinced
its intent through unambiguous language in the statute.25  If the congres-
sional intent is apparent in the statute itself, the court applies that interpre-
tation.26  Whether Congress’s intent is clear or ambiguous within the
statutory language is unique to each statutory context and is often a daunt-
ing task.  If the court finds the statutory language is ambiguous or silent
regarding congressional intent, then the court presumes that Congress dele-
gated interpretive authority to the agency and moves to Step Two.27
During Chevron Step Two, the court decides if the agency’s interpreta-
tion is a permissible construction of the statute.28  Traditionally, Step Two
is characterized by broad respect for congressional delegation to agency ex-
pertise.29  This Note identifies instances where Justices have found that the
Problem constituted statutory ambiguity under Step One, discusses some
actions that agencies have taken to address the Problem, and explains why
some Justices concluded that those actions were impermissible exercises
under Step Two.  From this discussion, this Note contends that the Prob-
lem can present a nontraditional definition of ambiguity that may allow
agencies greater interpretive flexibility.
III. CASE STUDIES APPLYING CHEVRON TO
BROKEN STATUTORY FRAMEWORKS
The statutes in Scialabba and UARG contain broad, unambiguous man-
dates to agencies; however, when these mandates were applied to new or
unforeseen circumstances, the Problem arose: the statutes became internally
inconsistent and the framework appeared unworkable.  In each case, an
agency sought to resolve the complication and accomplish its mandate.  The
23. Id. at 865–66.
24. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 511, 520 (1989) (describing the origins of Chevron, defending the doctrine, and arguing
that the determination of when ambiguity exists in a statute is critical to Chevron review).
25. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 843–44.
28. Id. at 843.
29. Complicating the Chevron framework is the evolution of a third step—Chevron Step
Zero—at which the court decides whether to apply Chevron deference at all. See United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (explaining Chevron Step Zero). Chevron Step
Zero is not relevant for purposes of this Note as the cases discussed herein involve decisions
preceded by formal procedures.
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Supreme Court reviewed each agency’s interpretative action under Chevron.
While the Court was able to come to a conclusion in each case, its Chevron
analysis was divided.  The Court’s splintered opinions demonstrate that the
Problem can influence the traditional understanding of ambiguity and allow
an agency deference or greater interpretive flexibility when pursuing an
unambiguous mandate.
A. Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio: Internal Statutory
Inconsistency or Direct Conflict
In Scialabba, the Problem arose in the context of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA).30  Under the INA, lawful permanent residents
(LPRs) may petition for certain family members—their minor children,
spouse, and siblings—to obtain immigrant visas.31  These family members
are referred to as “principal beneficiaries” under the INA.32  In turn, the
spouse and minor children of a principal beneficiary are “derivative benefi-
ciaries.”33  The LPR is known as the “sponsor.”34  When an LPR files a
petition for an immigrant visa with United States Citizenship and Immigra-
tion Services (USCIS), all of his beneficiaries are given a priority date for
an immigrant visa.35
In some instances, a minor child beneficiary “aged-out” of the INA,
meaning the beneficiary reached 21 years of age or older while his sponsor
was waiting for a visa.36  As a result, the child no longer qualified for princi-
pal or derivative beneficiary status.37  In these cases, the “aged-out” immi-
grant could no longer “piggy-back” on the qualifying principal and would
need to re-petition and restart the visa process over as a principal or LPR.38
The Child Protection Status Act (CSPA) attempts to remedy this unantici-
pated problem.39  The relevant language of the CSPA reads, “[i]f the age of
an alien is determined . . . to be 21 years of age or older,” notwithstanding
30. Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2196, 2201 (2014) (holding that
deference was owed to the BIA’s reasonable interpretation of CSPA that priority date reten-
tion, based on automatic conversion to the appropriate family preference category for a pri-
mary beneficiary, applies only to aged-out derivative beneficiaries who qualify or could have
qualified as principal beneficiaries without seeking new sponsor).
31. The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2015).
32. Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2196.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 2198.
35. Id. at 2196.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 2199.
38. See id. at 2198–99.
39. Id. at 2199.
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certain allowances for bureaucratic delay,40 “the alien’s petition shall auto-
matically be converted to the appropriate category and the alien shall retain
the original priority date issued upon receipt of the original petition.”41
Following enactment of the CSPA, USCIS refused to convert some
beneficiary petitions.  LPRs of aged-out beneficiaries challenged the refusal
and demanded retention of their beneficiaries’ original priority dates.42
The Bureau of Immigrant Appeals (BIA) upheld USCIS’s refusals.  As the
BIA interpreted the CSPA, USCIS was required to convert only those peti-
tions that did not require a new LPR to be converted.43 Scialabba addressed
whether the BIA reasonably interpreted the CSPA.44
Justice Kagan, joined in full by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg, wrote
the plurality opinion in Scialabba, which gave deference to the BIA’s analy-
sis of the CSPA.45  The first clause of the CSPA stated that any aged-out
beneficiary’s petition “shall” be automatically converted to the appropriate
category, but the second clause stated that converted aliens shall retain their
original priority date.46  Sometimes, when an alien aged-out, there was not
a new sponsor available to convert the alien to a principal beneficiary.47  In
those instances, the alien could not retain her original priority date.48  Jus-
tice Kagan recognized that “[t]he two faces of the statute do not easily co-
here with each other: Read either most naturally, and the other appears to
mean not what it says.”49  Justice Kagan’s plurality treated this conflict as a
form of ambiguity.50  The plurality moved past Chevron Step One and de-
termined that the agency could resolve the conflict in the statutory language
under Chevron Step Two by choosing between the competing statutory
commands; the plurality then deferred to the BIA’s choice of outcomes
under Chevron Step Two.51
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Scalia, concurred in the Court’s
judgment deferring to the agency’s interpretation, but concluded that the
agency passed Chevron Step Two because the statute was ambiguous, not
40. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(1)–(2) (2012); see also Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2196, 2201
(upholding interpretation that bureaucratic delay does not include delays stemming from a
lack of available visas).
41. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3).
42. Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2201–02.
43. Matter of Wang, 25 I. & N. Dec. 28, 28 (BIA 2009).
44. See Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2201–02.
45. Id. at 2196.
46. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3).
47. Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2206.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 2203.
50. Id. at 2207.
51. Id.
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because there was a conflict in the statute.52  Chief Justice Roberts clarified
that direct conflict would not constitute statutory ambiguity.53  He stated
that when a statute can be read as being in tension, then the Court’s job is
to fit all parts of the statute into a harmonious whole if possible.54
Justice Alito dissented from the plurality’s deferral to the BIA’s inter-
pretation of the CSPA.55  He believed that the BIA’s interpretation failed
Chevron Step One because the statute was not in conflict or ambiguous.56
The statute commanded USCIS to convert the aged-out petitions to the
appropriate category in order to retain their priority date and “[t]he Board
was not free to disregard this clear statutory command.”57  The plurality
held that an appropriate category did not always exist and therefore, the
aged-out immigrants had to re-file.58  Justice Alito argued that an appropri-
ate category did exist; beause the adult children remained children of the
sponsor or LPR, their petitions could be converted to preference status for
adult unmarried children of an LPR.59  Justice Alito proposed an interpreta-
tion that adopted what he viewed as the unambiguous statutory text.60  No-
tably, Justice Alito agreed with Chief Justice Roberts’s disapproval of the
plurality’s definition of statutory ambiguity.61  Justice Alito concluded that
a direct conflict was not a statutory ambiguity under Chevron Step One and
that an agency is not authorized to choose a path of interpretation when a
statute is directly and unequivocally internally conflicted.62
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Breyer and Thomas, dissented
separately from Justice Alito.63  Their dissent agreed with Justice Alito that
the statutory language was unambiguous and that the BIA’s interpretation
failed Chevron Step One for not applying the statute’s clear directive.64
Likewise, their dissent did not believe that the statute was directly con-
flicted and echoed the concurrence in stating that when a statute is inter-
nally inconsistent, then an agency’s job is to fit all parts of the statute into a
52. Id. at 2214–16 (Roberts, J., concurring).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2216 (Alito, J., dissenting).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2208 (majority opinion).




63. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 2217.
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harmonious whole, if possible.65  They found that the inconsistency in the
statute was not an ambiguity under Chevron Step One.
Yet their view on how the agency should have interpreted the statute to
comply with its command differed from Justice Alito’s view in that Justice
Sotomayor argued automatic conversion was not a prerequisite for a benefi-
ciary to retain his priority date.66  She explained that the first clause in the
CSPA stated the only condition necessary to retaining original priority
date: be twenty-one years of age or older for the purposes of derivative
beneficiary status.67  Therefore, all categories of aged-out children were en-
titled to retain their original priority dates.68
The fragmented opinions in Scialabba indicate that ambiguity may exist
under an unambiguous statutory provision given the Problem.  The CSPA’s
provisions mandated visa conversion and priority date retention, but these
commands seemed inconsistent as applied to the unforeseen circumstances
where an immigrant aged-out of beneficiary status before his LPR obtained
a visa.  The Court deferred to the BIA’s interpretation of the statute that
resolved the inconsistency created by the Problem.  After reviewing
Scialabba’s opinions alongside the opinions in UARG, the scope of ambiguity
within broken statutory frameworks begins to emerge.
B. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA:
An Unworkable Statutory Program
The Clean Air Act’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD)
program prohibits the construction or modification of a major emitting fa-
cility in a PSD area without a permit.69  Major emitting facilities are de-
fined as “stationary sources of air pollutants which emit, or have the
potential to emit, one hundred tons per year or more of any air pollutant.”70
Historically, the negative public health effects of greenhouse gases (GHGs)
were unknown and, as a result, GHGs were not considered a pollutant for
the purposes of the Clean Air Act (CAA).  As scientific knowledge regard-
ing the negative effects of GHGs grew, the regulation of GHGs became
controversial.  The debate over regulation culminated when the Supreme
Court held that the EPA could regulate GHGs under the CAA if it found
they were pollutants.71  Following the ruling, the EPA conducted a study of
65. Id. at 2220.
66. Id. at 2216 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“I, like Justice Sotomayor, would affirm the Court
of Appeals, my justification for doing so differs somewhat from hers.”).
67. Id. at 2217 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
68. Id.
69. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a)(1), 7479(2)(c) (1990).
70. Id. §§ 7661(2)(B), 7602(j) (2015).
71. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534–35 (2007).
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the health effects of GHGs and issued a finding declaring GHGs a pollu-
tant under the CAA.72
This change in scientific knowledge created two problems regarding the
EPA’s interpretation and application of the PSD program.  First, the EPA
believed that the new finding triggered PSD requirements for stationary
sources emitting GHGs in quantities above 100 tons per year (tpy).73  Be-
cause GHGs tend to be emitted in quantities significantly greater than con-
ventional pollutants, the 100 tpy threshold would subject numerous small
emitters, such as office and residential buildings, to PSD requirements.74
Regulating all facilities emitting such small amounts of GHGs would
“would radically expand those programs [PSD and Title V of CAA], making
them both unadministrable and unrecognizable to the Congress that de-
signed them.”75  This change in the PSD program would be unworkable
within the CAA’s regulatory structure.76  The EPA tried to address this
unworkability through an interpretive rulemaking, which tailored the PSD
program to develop a better regulatory scheme for stationary emitters of
GHGs.77  Through its Tailoring Rule, the EPA adjusted the triggering stat-
utory threshold from 100 tpy to 100,000 tpy for GHG sources.78
Second, in order to obtain a permit under the PSD program, a facility
must use Best Available Control Technology (BACT) for each pollutant
subject to regulation under the CAA.79  Some facilities may be subject to
the PSD program and, in turn, BACT standards because of their emissions
of conventional pollutants, but will not have triggered the PSD program for
their emission of GHGs.80  These facilities have been termed “anyway” fa-
cilities because they are already subject to permitting requirements under
the PSD program due to exceeding the statutory threshold for a pollutant
other than GHGs.81  The EPA’s interpretation required these “anyway” fa-
72. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496-01, 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1).
73. Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That Determine Pollutants Cov-
ered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg 17,004-01, 17,022–23 (Apr. 2, 2010)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 51, 70, 71).
74. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2436 (2014).
75. Id. at 2437 (citation omitted).
76. Id. at 2442.
77. Id. at 2437.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2447.
80. Id. at 2437.
81. Id.
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cilities to meet BACT standards for their GHG emissions since they were
already within the PSD program.82
Various groups challenged the EPA’s new interpretation of the CAA
before the Supreme Court in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, arguing
that the EPA acted outside its permissible scope of interpretation under
Chevron.83  Two issues were before the Court: first, whether the EPA rea-
sonably interpreted the PSD program trigger for GHGs, and second,
whether the EPA could require “anyways” emitters of GHGs to meet
BACT standards for emissions other than GHGs.84
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy in
full, wrote for a shifting majority on both issues (meaning that the majority
for each issue was comprised of different Justices).85  The Court gave defer-
ence to the EPA’s interpretation regarding the BACT program,86 but re-
jected the EPA’s interpretation of the PSD triggering provision.87
1. No Deference for EPA’s Tailoring Rule
The Court, in a majority formed by the three-Justice plurality and the
concurrence of Justices Alito and Thomas, held that the CAA did not re-
quire, nor did it allow, the EPA’s interpretation of the PSD program.88  If
the PSD program threshold trigger was applied to GHGs, it would require
a drastic and unworkable expansion of agency regulation that could not be
read as an implicit delegation from Congress.89  For example, if PSD and
Title V permitting requirements were directly applied to GHGs, “annual
permit applications would jump from about 800 to nearly 82,000; annual
administrative costs would swell from $12 million to over $1.5 billion; and
decade-long delays in issuing permits would become common, causing con-
struction projects to grind to a halt nationwide.”90  The majority concluded
that “applying the PSD and Title V permitting requirements to greenhouse
gases would be inconsistent with—in fact, would overthrow—the Act’s struc-
ture and design.”91
82. Id.; 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(48) (2016).
83. See UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2438–39.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2432.
86. Id. at 2448.
87. Id. at 2439.
88. Id. at 2439, 2442.
89. See id. at 2444 (“EPA’s interpretation is also unreasonable because it would bring
about an enormous and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority without clear
congressional authorization.”).
90. Id. at 2443.
91. Id. at 2442.
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Nonetheless, the majority determined that the EPA could not cure the
unworkability of the CAA by tailoring its explicit terms.92  Justice Scalia
explained that an agency could not change the unambiguous language of a
statute when its interpretation of the statute was unworkable.93  If almost
all stationary sources of GHGs would exceed the statutory threshold trig-
gering the PSD permitting requirement and this result seemed impractical,
then the agency should have looked to a more sensible interpretation of the
Act.94  “[T]he need to rewrite clear provisions of the statute should have
alerted EPA that it had taken a wrong interpretive turn.”95
Justice Scalia’s interpretation suggests that the majority may have per-
mitted the agency some flexibility, and thus may have deferred to an alter-
native interpretation of the CAA under Chevron Step Two, if the agency
had taken a different “interpretive turn.”  He argued that “any air pollutant”
as defined under the CAA could be read as a broad category of examples of
substances that the EPA could regulate under some of the Act’s operative
provisions.96  Under this interpretation, the EPA would not regulate a sub-
stance in a given operative program if regulation of the pollutant did not fit
properly in the implementation strategy of that provision of the Act.97  Jus-
tice Scalia explained that “[precedent] does not strip EPA of authority to
exclude greenhouse gases from the class of regulable air pollutants under
other parts of the Act where their inclusion would be inconsistent with the
statutory scheme.”98  Under the majority’s interpretation, the agency could
have resolved the statutory unworkability by excluding GHGs from the
PSD program and thus passed Chevron Step Two.
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Kagan, Sotomayor, and Ginsburg, dis-
sented from the majority’s analysis of the PSD program trigger.99  Like the
majority, the dissent recognized the unworkability that would result from a
plain interpretation and direct application of the PSD program to GHGs100
92. Id. at 2445.
93. Id. at 2442 (quoting Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2529
(2013)).
94. Id. at 2442–43.
95. Id. at 2446.
96. Id. at 2442.
97. Id. at 2442–43 (“EPA itself has repeatedly acknowledged that applying the PSD
and Title V permitting requirements to greenhouse gases would be inconsistent with—in
fact, would overthrow—the Act’s structure and design. . . . A brief review of the relevant
statutory provisions leaves no doubt that the PSD program and Title V are designed to apply
to, and cannot rationally be extended beyond, a relative handful of large sources capable of
shouldering heavy substantive and procedural burdens.”).
98. Id. at 2441.
99. Id. at 2449–58 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
100. Id. at 2450–51.
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and agreed that the EPA could not adjust the explicit threshold stated in the
CAA.101  However, the dissent believed there was another interpretation of
the CAA that allowed the EPA to regulate GHG sources under the PSD
program.102
The dissent concluded that the statute triggered the PSD program for
emitters of GHGs in excess of the threshold just as it did for any other
pollutants under the Act exceeding the threshold.103  However, the dissent
read the definition of major emitting facility104 to contain an implicit excep-
tion for smaller sources of GHGs, explaining that “[a]s a linguistic matter,
one can just as easily read an implicit exception for small-scale greenhouse
gas emissions into the phrase ‘any source’ as into the phrase ‘any air pollu-
tant.’”105  Justice Breyer explained that a sensible reading excludes small-
scale sources of GHGs from the definition of “any source” because “law has
long recognized that terms such as ‘any’ admit of unwritten limitations and
exceptions.”106
The dissent argued that reading an exception into the scope of sources
covered by the PSD program was more reasonable than reading an excep-
tion into the “any air pollutant” provision as the majority suggested because
the latter would exclude sources of GHGs from ever triggering the PSD
program requirements.107  The dissent argued that the exclusion of all
sources of GHGs from the PSD program was inconsistent with the CAA’s
mandate to regulate all pollutants harmful to public health.108  Justice
Breyer explained, “The purpose of [the 250 tons-per-year threshold] num-
ber was not to prevent the regulation of dangerous air pollutants that cannot
be sensibly regulated at that particular threshold.”109  Thus, despite dis-
agreeing with the EPA’s rewriting of the 250 tpy threshold, the dissent
would have deferred, under Chevron Step Two, to the EPA’s general conclu-
sion that emitters of GHGs triggered the PSD program.110
101. Id. at 2451 (“The statute says nothing about agency discretion to change [the 250
tons-per-year threshold] number.”).
102. Id. at 2452–54.
103. See id. at 2454–55.
104. See 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (1990).
105. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2452 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2453–54 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1990)).
109. Id. at 2453.
110. Id. at 2455.
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2. Deference Warranted for EPA’s BACT Interpretation
The Court deferred to the EPA’s interpretation of the BACT program
in a majority formed by Justice Scalia’s plurality and the concurrences of
Justices Breyer, Kagan, Sotomayor, and Ginsburg.111  The EPA may require
these “already regulated” facilities to meet BACT standards for other pollu-
tants under the CAA rather than only those pollutants that triggered the
facilities’ PSD permit requirements.112  The Court gave the agency defer-
ence at Step One for following the unambiguous language of the BACT
program in the CAA: “[T]he more specific phrasing of the BACT provision
suggests that the necessary judgment [in identifying the subset of pollutants
covered by the BACT program] has already been made by Congress.”113
Additionally, Justice Scalia explained that this interpretation was a permis-
sible application of the CAA to new scientific findings because it did not
result in an unworkable statutory program.114  “Even if the text were not
clear, applying BACT to greenhouse gases is not so disastrously
unworkable . . . .”115
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred concerning the PSD
program and dissented regarding the BACT program.116  Their concurrence
approved of the majority’s holding that the EPA’s interpretation of the PSD
program, which adjusted unambiguous statutory language in an attempt to
fix an unworkable system, was impermissible.117  But, they went one step
further, arguing that the PSD and BACT programs should not be read to
apply to GHGs at all.118
According to Justices Alito and Thomas, the agency failed Chevron Step
One because the CAA’s text and structure were unambiguous regarding the
PSD program, and GHGs did not fit within it regardless of the type of
emitter.119  “BACT analysis, like the rest of the Clean Air Act, was devel-
oped for use in regulating the emission of conventional pollutants and is
simply not suited for use with respect to greenhouse gases.”120  To Justices
Alito and Thomas, unworkability resulting from the Problem did not allow
the agency or the Court to provide an alternative interpretation.121  Instead,
111. Id. at 2448 (majority opinion).
112. Id. at 2449.
113. Id. at 2448.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2455–56 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2456.
119. Id. at 2456–57.
120. Id. at 2458.
121. Id. at 2455.
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they argued that unworkability signaled a limitation on the statute’s scope
and thus on the agency’s authority.122
The mix of opinions in UARG demonstrate that unworkability influ-
ences the Court’s ambiguity analysis under Chevron.  When the Chevron
positions in each UARG opinion are separated and compared to the argu-
ments in Scialabba, more detailed insights into Chevron ambiguity begin to
emerge.
IV. DEFINING AMBIGUITY
The seven combined opinions of Scialabba and UARG show that defini-
tions of ambiguity can vary within broken statutory frameworks, and that
ambiguity can arise, despite unambiguous text.  Importantly, these cases
illuminate three key inquires: (1) whether the Problem ever amounts to an
ambiguity that will influence the Court’s Chevron review; (2) if so, which
forms of the Problem constitute ambiguity; and (3) whether any agency
actions are impermissible when addressing the Problem.
The Problem can arise in many different circumstances; however, this
section addresses the types of broken statutory framework at issue in
Scialabba and UARG—direct conflict, internal inconsistency, and un-
workability—and how each one can affect the Chevron ambiguity analysis by
moving the Court to Step Two or providing greater interpretive flexibility
under Step One.  Whether any of the above circumstances constitutes ambi-
guity varies by Justice and by case, but the opinions in Scialabba and UARG
share some perspectives on how ambiguity may operate in the Chevron re-
view of broken statutory frameworks.
A. Unworkability as Ambiguity
When confronted with an unworkable statute, seven Justices123 allowed
an agency some interpretive flexibility.  While fewer than all seven equated
unworkability with ambiguity, they all indicated that unworkability may
permit adoption of an alternative interpretation of the statute.  In UARG,
the EPA believed that the PSD program was triggered solely by a source’s
emission of GHGs, but recognized that interpretation would create an un-
workable program.124  The majority agreed that such a program would be
unworkable, but criticized the EPA for not seeking an alternative interpre-
122. Id. (discussing his disagreement with the Court’s decision in Mass. v. EPA and the
Court’s failure to limit the CAA’s scope when confronted with unworkability).
123. This occurred in Justice Scalia’s majority in UARG, which was joined by Justice
Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Breyer’s concurrence in UARG, which was
joined by Justices Kagan, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor.
124. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2437.
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tation of the statute in light of the unworkability.  The broad language of
‘any air pollutant’ gave the agency some discretion to address the complica-
tions created when the CAA mandate was applied to GHGs.  Justice Scalia
explained, “[T]he dubious breadth of ‘any air pollutant’ in the permitting
triggers suggests a role for agency judgment in identifying the subset of
pollutants covered by the particular regulatory program at issue.”125  Simi-
larly, Justice Breyer’s dissent noted that “from a legal, administrative, and
functional perspective” there was a reading of the statute that was sensi-
ble:126 a more limiting interpretation of the term “any source” under the
definition of “major emitting facility.”127
In the face of unambiguous statutory provisions that appeared to create
an unworkable program, both the majority and Justice Breyer’s dissent
urged the agency to adopt alternative constructions of other arguably am-
biguous portions of the Clean Air Act.128  The unworkability allowed review
of the agency’s interpretation to pass to Step Two because the proper appli-
cation of the provisions was ambiguous in the context of the remainder of
the statute even though the provisions were unambiguous.  Unworkability
gave the agency some flexibility, but not boundless authority–as Justice
Scalia explained, “agencies exercise discretion only in the interstices created
by statutory silence or ambiguity; they must always give effect to the unam-
biguously expressed intent of Congress.”129  Therefore, whether un-
workability is a form of ambiguity itself is unclear, but unworkability can
allow an agency some flexibility to move past Step One.
In contrast, unworkability can signal that Congress intended the statute
to provide an agency limited power.  For example, dissenting in UARG,
Justices Alito and Thomas argued that the BACT program’s design and
internal EPA guidance documents showed that the CAA did not contem-
plate application of the BACT program to GHGs.130  They concluded that
the text of the statute was unambiguous and did not encompass GHGs,
which explained why applying the program to GHGs was unworkable.131
Accordingly, they did not defer to an interpretation that they believed al-
tered the CAA in order to give the agency unauthorized power over GHG
emissions.132  Their dissent remained in Chevron Step One regarding the
125. Id. at 2448.
126. Id. at 2453 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
127. Id. at 2452–53.
128. Id. at 2448 (majority opinion), 2452–53 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
129. Id. at 2445 (majority opinion) (citation omitted).
130. Id. at 2458 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
131. Id. at 2455.
132. Id. at 2458.
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BACT program while the rest of the Court was willing to find that the
unworkability could move the Court’s review to Step Two.
Interestingly, Justice Alito, in his dissent in Scialabba, theorized that he
would move to Step Two when considering an internal statutory inconsis-
tency, if the agency worked within an ambiguous portion of the statute.133
Likewise, Justice Thomas joined in Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Scialabba
in which she suggested that the BIA could have interpreted other ambigu-
ous portions of the CSPA in order to correct the internal inconsistency in
the unambiguous text.134  Considering that internal inconsistency and un-
workability are often linked, it is unclear why Justices Alito and Thomas
may have been willing to defer in Scialabba but not in UARG.
Consider that two provisions in a statute may be consistent until an
agency complies with both provisions in a new circumstance.  For instance,
in UARG, the PSD program provisions seemed consistent with the 250 tpy
threshold provision.  The EPA reasonably complied with both provisions
until it applied the provisions to GHG emitters.  Then suddenly, the
threshold provision seemed inconsistent with the PSD regulatory provi-
sions.  The provisions were internally inconsistent because when the EPA
complied with both provisions, the statutory program was unworkable.135
In Scialabba, the first clause of the CSPA, establishing an age condition,
conflicted with the second clause, which required automatic petition conver-
sion and priority retention, because when the BIA complied with both pro-
visions the statutory program was unworkable.136  In both cases, the
statutory inconsistency in the language arose only because of unworkability
arising in the statutory scheme.  These are just two examples of how the
concepts of internal inconsistency and unworkability can overlap in a single
statute given the right framing.  Nevertheless, Justices Alito and Thomas
had different perspectives on ambiguity in Scialabba and UARG.137  As a
133. Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2216 (2014) (Alito, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 2217 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
135. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2437 (presenting EPA’s argument that if it applied the PSD
program to GHG sources within the statutory threshold, the program would be
“unadministrable”).
136. Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2202 (providing the BIA’s argument that it could not allow
all beneficiaries to retain their original priority dates because not all beneficiaries’ petitions
could be automatically converted and if the BIA did allow retention, the beneficiaries would
cut the visa line ahead of those in other preference categories).
137. See supra notes 130–34 and accompanying text.  Perhaps Justices Alito and Thomas
view inconsistency as distinct from unworkability because to the extent one can differentiate
between the concepts, the former is internal and the latter is external.  When reading a
statute, the Court presumes Congress did not enact inconsistent provisions. See ANTONIN
SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 180 (2012) (the
Harmonious-Reading Canon of interpretation states that “[t]he provisions of a text should be
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result, this Note reviews the two forms of broken statutory framework
independently.
B. Internal Inconsistency as Ambiguity
When the unambiguous text of a statute seems internally inconsistent
and an ambiguous provision can be read to avoid or dismiss the conflict, all
Justices138 have indicated they would allow an agency to adopt the non-
conflicting reading.  In Scialabba, Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence con-
cluded that no conflict existed in the CSPA because any alleged conflict was
resolved through an interpretation that incorporated the requirements for
automatic conversion as a prerequisite to conversion.139  Similarly, in Justice
Sotomayor’s dissent in Scialabba, she concluded that the BIA failed to recog-
nize an interpretation of the CSPA that allowed USCIS to comply with the
statute’s conversion command.140  Alien petitioners could retain their origi-
nal priority dates even absent the ability of their petitions to be automati-
cally converted.  She reasoned that “the Court and the BIA ignore[d]
obvious ways in which § 1153(h)(3) can operate as a coherent whole and
instead construe[d] the statute as a self-contradiction that was broken from
the moment Congress wrote it.”141
In his dissent in Scialabba, Justice Alito agreed with Justice Sotomayor’s
dissent that the CSPA had a clear command and the agency had to convert
alien petitions.142  He found that any conflict with the command could be
avoided through an interpretation that read “appropriate category” to mean
conversion to “preference status, as unmarried, adult children of legal per-
manent residents.”143  Last, Justice Kagan’s plurality found that the BIA
could resolve the statutory conflict through an interpretation consistent
with the remedial clause of the Act.144  Each member of the Court indicated
interpreted in a way that renders them compatible, not contradictory”).  Therefore, the
Court will prefer an interpretation that resolves or avoids a textual conflict.  In doing so, the
Court may allow an agency more interpretive flexibility.  In contrast, if only the application
of the statute is problematic, then the application may be wrong.  There is no presumption
that Congress intended the statute to apply to the present circumstances.  The Court has no
obligation to prefer an interpretation that resolves or avoids the unworkability.  Justice
Thomas joined in Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, which also suggested an interpretation of the
statute that eliminated any alleged conflict.
138. See Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2207 (Kagan, J., plurality opinion), 2215 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring), 2216 (Alito, J., dissenting), 2217 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 2215 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
140. Id. at 2217 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 2216 (Alito, J., dissenting).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2207 (Kagan, J., plurality opinion).
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that an internal inconsistency based on unambiguous commands in the stat-
ute could allow an agency some interpretive flexibility to resolve the incon-
sistency.  This interpretive flexibility implies that inconsistency is a form of
ambiguity, but labeling it so would not be accurate, because some of the
Justices indicated that they were resolving Scialabba under Step One.145
Where exactly internal inconsistency, or unworkability for that matter,
falls within the Chevron analysis and its relationship to ambiguity are not
static.  As illustrated by the various opinions in Scialabba and UARG, the
Problem can exist when the text of the statute is arguably unambiguous, but
this lack of ambiguity does not mean that the agency has no interpretive
flexibility.146  Some Justices chose to characterize inconsistency or un-
workability as ambiguity and move to Step Two.147  Others clarified that
the statutory mandate was unambiguous, but inconsistency or unworkability
could allow for exploration of other provisions of the statute in order to
honor the statute’s unambiguous command under Step One.148  In practice,
these two approaches often reach the same result: deference to an agency’s
interpretation.149  Thus, on some level, internal inconsistency is similar to
ambiguity in that it can allow an agency some interpretive flexibility.
C. Direct Conflict as Ambiguity
In Scialabba, five Justices indicated that direct, or unresolvable, statu-
tory conflict can be ambiguity.150  A direct conflict differs from an internal
145. See id. at 2216 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]he statute is clear on at least one point . . .
[t]he Board was not free to disregard this clear statutory command.”); see also id. at 2217
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (“The Court [plurality] does not identify any
ambiguity in the dispositive initial clause of § 1153(h)(3).  Indeed, it candidly admits that the
clause mandates relief for every aged-out beneficiary of a family-preference petition in any
of the five categories.”).
146. Consider Justice Alito’s position in UARG that unworkability was not an ambiguity
and was instead a signal on the limit of the agency’s interpretive authority.
147. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Kagan’s Chevron
analysis in her plurality opinion in Scialabba); supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text
(discussing Chief Justice Roberts’ Chevron analysis in his concurring opinion in Scialabba);
supra notes 99–110 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Breyer’s Chevron analysis in his
dissent in UARG).
148. See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Alito’s Chevron
analysis in his dissent in Scialabba); supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text (discussing
Justice Sotomayor’s Chevron analysis in her dissent in Scialabba); supra notes 96–98 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia’s Chevron analysis in UARG).
149. Although, the agency should not reach its interpretation through one of the imper-
missible actions discussed infra Section V.
150. This occurred in Justice Kagan’s plurality, which was joined by Justices Ginsburg
and Kennedy, and in Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, which was joined by Justice Breyer.  Justice
Thomas is not included here because he dissented from footnote 3 in Justice Sotomayor’s
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inconsistency because the latter can be resolved through interpretive tools
while the former is unresolvable.  Agencies can receive Chevron deference
even when interpreting an unambiguous statute if two provisions of the
statute are in direct, unresolvable conflict with one another.  Justice Kagan
explained, “[I]nternal tension makes possible alternative reasonable con-
structions, bringing into correspondence in one way or another the section’s
different parts.”151  In instances of direct conflict, an agency may address
the ambiguity by choosing which of the two conflicting provisions apply in
a given case.  Justice Kagan wrote, “[T]he ambiguity those ill-fitting clauses
create instead left the Board with a choice—essentially of how to reconcile
the statute’s different commands.”152  This broader definition of ambiguity
equates direct textual conflict with statutory ambiguity and allows an
agency to pass to Chevron Step Two when it arises.  Justice Kagan explained
the scope of ambiguity in Scialabba:
[Section] 1153(h)(3)’s ill-fitting clauses left the BIA to choose how
to reconcile the statute’s different commands.  It reasonably opted
to abide by the inherent limits of § 1153(h)(3)’s remedial clause,
rather than go beyond those limits so as to match the sweep of the
first clause’s condition.  When an agency thus resolves statutory
tension, ordinary principles of administrative deference require this
Court to defer.153
Likewise, Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Scialabba noted that in cases of
truly direct statutory conflict, the Court should defer to the agency’s choice
between the competing provisions.  They concluded that in some limited
circumstances, “conflict . . . can make deference appropriate to an agency’s
decision to override unambiguous statutory text.”154  Justices Kagan’s and
Sotomayor’s opinions in Scialabba are important because they suggest that
in some cases statutory ambiguity may encompass textual conflict.
Within the definition of ambiguity discussed above exists a narrower
definition of ambiguity based on the definition of direct conflict.  For in-
stance, in Scialabba, Justices Kagan, Kennedy, and Ginsburg found the
CSPA was in direct conflict while the remainder of the Court found either
no conflict at all or only an internal inconsistency that could be resolved
dissent which shows his disagreement with her Chevron application to direct conflicts.  This
distinction is discussed later in this section.
151. Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2203 (2014) (Kagan, J., plurality).
152. Id. at 2207.
153. Id. at 2194–95.
154. Id. at 2219 n.3 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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through interpretive tools.155  Justices Sotomayor and Alito believed the
CSPA had an unambiguous command and suggested interpretations of
other ambiguous portions of the Act to resolve or dispense with the alleged
conflict and honor the unambiguous command.156  While Justice
Sotomayor’s dissent agreed with the plurality that a direct conflict consti-
tuted ambiguity, it narrowed the plurality’s definition of direct conflict.
The dissent indicated that a direct conflict, and thus an ambiguity, exists
only when an exact figure or word is in conflict between two provisions in
the statute.  For example, despite finding no direct conflict in Scialabba, the
dissent noted that if the statutory conflict had been direct rather than re-
solvable, they would have allowed the agency to choose between the com-
peting provisions under Chevron Step Two.157  Justice Sotomayor explained
that direct conflict arises only when it is impossible for an agency to comply
with two statutory provisions.  She provided an example from National As-
sociation of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife,158 where the Clean Water
Act (CWA) required the agency to consider set criteria in making a particu-
lar decision, but the Endangered Species Act (ESA) required the agency to
consider additional criteria:
To understand the kind of conflict that can make deference appro-
priate to an agency’s decision to override unambiguous statutory
text, consider the provisions at issue in National Assn. of Home
Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife. . . .  The agency [ ] could not “si-
multaneously obey” both commands: It could consider 9 criteria or
10, but not both.  In that circumstance, we found it appropriate to
defer to the agency’s choice as to “which command must give
way.”159
According to the dissent, the statute at issue in Scialabba, the CSPA, simply
did not present the BIA with the level of direct conflict that was at issue in
National Association of Home Builders over the Endangered Species Act and
the Clean Water Act.160  Thus, one definition of ambiguity could include
155. See id. at 2207 (Kagan, J., plurality opinion).
156. Id. at 2219 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (finding the statute had a clear interpreta-
tion that eliminated the conflict).
157. Id. at 2219 n.3 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
158. Nat’l Assoc. of Home Builders v. Defs. Of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007).
159. Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2220 n.3 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
160. Importantly, Justices Alito, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Chief Justice Roberts
did not find a direct irreconcilable conflict between the ESA and the CWA in Nat’l Ass’n of
Home Builders.  Instead, they held that the internal inconsistency was an ambiguity created
by the statutes’ unambiguous commands and deferred to the agency’s resolution, which
found that the exclusive nine criteria in the CWA did not trigger consideration of additional
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direct conflict and another slightly narrower definition of ambiguity could
include only “truly” direct conflicts.
D. Direct Conflict as Not Ambiguity
Whether direct conflict constitutes ambiguity is contested among the
Court. Some Justices concluded in Scialabba that direct conflict was not
ambiguity.  If the text of the statute is unambiguous, an agency fails Chev-
ron Step One regardless of direct conflict because Congress has spoken to
the issue.161  For example, after finding the statute did not contain a direct
conflict, Chief Justice Roberts wrote, “Direct conflict is not ambiguity, and
the resolution of such a conflict is not statutory construction but legislative
choice. Chevron is not a license for an agency to repair a statute that does
not make sense.”162  In Justice Alito’s dissent, despite finding that the stat-
ute was in conflict, he agreed with Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence that
Chevron did not extend to agency resolution of direct statutory conflict.163
Interestingly, Justice Thomas disagreed with Justice Sotomayor’s third foot-
note in Scialabba, where she endorsed agency discretion over truly direct
conflicts.164  Justice Thomas’s dissent from footnote three indicates that he
agreed with the concurrence’s Chevron analysis and would not find ambigu-
ity given a direct conflict, but also agreed with Justice Sotomayor’s dissent’s
determination that the CSPA did not possess a direct conflict.  If this is
correct, then four Justices abstained from finding ambiguity in direct con-
flict and held the agency to Step One.165
Under instances of “truly” direct conflict, an agency is placed in a diffi-
cult position given this more limited definition of ambiguity.  It cannot
ignore the conflict because that resolution would amount to “legislative
choice,”166 but an agency must still fulfill its statutory mandate.167  This
more limited definition of ambiguity fails to provide a remedy for agencies
criteria under the ESA. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 666–67.  Justices Ginsburg
and Breyer dissented (by joining Justice Stevens’ dissent) arguing that the CWA and the
ESA were conflicted, but were not “truly incapable of coexistence,” therefore the criteria in
the ESA were triggered, but the agency could honor both statutory commands. See id. at 678,
687 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justices Sotomayor and Kagan were not members of the Court
at the time.
161. See supra notes 53, 62, and 64–65, and accompanying text.
162. Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2214 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
163. See id. at 2216.
164. Id.
165. The four justices being Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Scalia, and
Thomas.
166. Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2214 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
167. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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attempting to work within a directly conflicted statute.168  Chief Justice
Roberts’s and Justice Alito’s analyses in Scialabba and UARG help by ex-
plaining that a statute is almost never directly conflicted;169 instead, an
agency failed to recognize an interpretation that would have resolved the
conflict, meaning the conflict was only an internal inconsistency.170  Thus,
the definition of direct conflict is narrower—encompassing only “truly” di-
rect conflicts.171  Other allegedly direct conflicts would in fact be resolvable
internal inconsistencies that would give an agency some interpretive flexi-
bility.172  In other words, the conflict or inconsistency in the unambiguous
text creates enough of an ambiguity to allow an agency to craft an interpre-
tation to remedy the conflict and honor the unambiguous text, but it does
not allow an agency to disregard an unambiguous provision in the statute.
Presumably, an agency should never be in a position where it cannot resolve
the conflict through an alternative interpretation, i.e., a “truly” direct con-
flict; otherwise it misunderstands its statutory mandate.
V. IMPERMISSIBLE AGENCY ACTION
After identifying an ambiguity, the next key of agency success under
Chevron review is to take permissible action.  Consequently, a court’s in-
quiry does not end with whether and under what circumstances an internal
inconsistency or unworkability constitutes a statutory ambiguity; it must
also consider which agency actions are an impermissible means of address-
ing ambiguity.  As discussed above in Section IV, the presence of a broken
statutory framework sometimes moves the Chevron inquiry to Step Two or
sometimes allows for greater flexibility under Step One.  In either instance,
168. Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2214 (Roberts, C.J., concurring), 2216 (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
169. See also Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 666 (2007)
(where Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito concluded that the statutes contained seem-
ingly irreconcilable commands, but allowed the agency some interpretive authority).
170. Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2215, 2216. (Chief Justice Roberts explaining how he be-
lieves the BIA could have resolved the apparent statutory conflict through a different inter-
pretation followed by Justice Alito similarly explaining); see also Natl. Ass’n of Home Builders,
551 US at 666 (Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, recognizing that the agency
could not “simultaneously obey the differing mandates” in the two statutes at issue, but the
agency could harmonize the statutes). But see Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2217 n.3 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (Justice Sotomayor used the same case as an example of when a statute is directly
conflicted).
171. Notice the similarity to Justice Sotomayor’s narrow definition of direct conflict
discussed supra notes 158–61 and accompanying text.  It seems that Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito may agree with Justice Sotomayor’s narrower definition of direct conflict, but
diverge on how to treat such conflicts.
172. See supra Section IV.B.
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an agency’s interpretive authority is not boundless. Scialabba and UARG
identify some actions that may be considered an impermissible means of
rectifying the Problem.
A. “Tailoring” the Text
The unworkable nature of a statute may provide an agency with some
interpretive authority,173 but an agency is not permitted to alter unambigu-
ous text and pass Step One.  In UARG the entire Court agreed174 that an
agency could not rewrite the unambiguous text of a statute through a
rulemaking to resolve an unworkable statutory framework.175  Justice Scalia
wrote in the majority opinion, “An agency has no power to ‘tailor’ legisla-
tion to bureaucratic policy goals by rewriting unambiguous statutory
terms.”176  Even Justice Breyer’s dissent, which would have confirmed EPA’s
authority to regulate GHGs through the PSD program, refused to give the
agency deference for rewriting the statute.  “The statute specifies a definite
number–250, not 100,000,” he noted.177  “[It] says nothing about agency dis-
cretion to change that number.”178  Justice Alito, concurring, similarly ob-
served that “[t]he Act contains specific emissions thresholds that trigger
PSD and Title V coverage, but the EPA crossed out the figures enacted by
Congress and substituted figures of its own . . . .  [T]he EPA is neither
required nor permitted to take this extraordinary step.”179  Altering explicit
statutory text is one of the few actions the entire Court seemed to agree
that an agency could not take when addressing the Problem.
B. Ignoring the Text
In Scialabba, six of the Justices did not allow the agency to resolve an
internal statutory inconsistency by choosing between seemingly conflicted
provisions.180  Instead, they suggested that the agency should have done its
best to find an alternative interpretation that harmoniously resolved the
173. See supra Section IV.A.
174. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014) (Scalia’s plurality
opinion as to the PSD program joined by Justices Kennedy and Roberts; Justice Breyer’s
dissent on the PSD program joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan; and Justice
Alito’s concurrence joined by Justice Thomas).
175. Id. at 2445 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (holding that EPA could not directly alter
the emissions threshold used to trigger the PSD program under the CAA).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 2451 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 2455 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
180. See Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014) (Chief Justices Roberts
concurrence joined by Justice Scalia; Justice Alito dissenting; Justice Sotomayor dissenting
with Justices Breyer and Thomas).
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conflict.  Dissenting, Justice Sotomayor concluded that the CSPA contained
a clear command and that the BIA failed Chevron Step One: “Congress has
spoken directly to the question in this case.”181  Justice Sotomayor’s dissent
rejected the plurality’s Chevron application, writing, “[T]he plurality tries to
fit this case into a special pocket of Chevron jurisprudence in which it says
we must defer to an agency’s decision to ignore a clear statutory command
due to a conflict between that command and another statutory provision.”182
In his dissent, Justice Alito critiqued the plurality for suggesting that “when
two halves of a statute ‘do not easily cohere with each other,’ an agency
administering the statute is free to decide which half it will obey.”183  Like
Justice Sotomayor, Justice Alito found that the CSPA was unambiguous
regarding automatic conversion of alien petitions, and the “[BIA] was not
free to disregard this clear statutory command.”184  Both Justices Sotomayor
and Alito found that the BIA failed Chevron Step One by choosing between
unambiguous provisions in the Act.185
In the concurrence in Scialabba, Chief Justice Roberts agreed with Jus-
tice Sotomayor’s dissent’s Chevron analysis despite disagreeing on the case
outcome.  Chief Justice Roberts explained that the BIA could not permissi-
bly choose between competing provisions.  “To the extent the plurality’s
opinion could be read to suggest that deference is warranted because of a
direct conflict between these clauses, that is wrong.”186  But, he emphasized
that the BIA was not taking such impermissible action in this case.  He
explained that he supported giving deference to the BIA’s statutory inter-
pretation because the statute was ambiguous and not directly conflicted,
stating, “I see no conflict, or even internal tension.”187  While other Justices
believed the statute contained an internal inconsistency, the concurrence
would have resolved this apparent conflict by reading only the second clause
in the CSPA as operative.188  Therefore, beyond the requirements of the
second clause, “Congress did not speak clearly to which petitions can auto-
matically be converted.  Whatever other interpretations of that provision
might be possible, it was reasonable, for the reasons explained by the plural-
ity, for the Board to interpret section 1153(h)(3).”189  Chief Justice Roberts
found that the statute was ambiguous and that the BIA deserved deference
181. Id. at 2217.
182. Id. at 2219 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 2216 (Alito, J., dissenting).
184. Id.
185. See supra notes 56–65 and accompanying text.
186. Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2214 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
187. Id. at 2214 (citation omitted).
188. Id. at 2215.
189. Id. (citation omitted).
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under Chevron Step Two.  Nonetheless, he was clear that he would not have
deferred if he believed the Act was unambiguous or that the BIA had disre-
garded unambiguous portions of it.190
Consequently, each of the three Justices and those joining their opin-
ions suggested that an agency could not choose between unambiguous statu-
tory provisions when attempting to address an internal inconsistency in the
statute.  In order to move to Step Two, an agency had to respect the unam-
biguous text and instead address its ambiguous application through inter-
pretation of other ambiguous provisions in the statute.
C. Functional Changes
There may be another potential limitation on agency action that exists
even when attempting to remedy the Problem under Chevron Step Two: An
agency’s interpretation should not functionally change the statute in an at-
tempt to make the statutory application workable.  The PSD majority in
UARG explained that a statute should not be interpreted to drastically
change its functionality, stating, “[A]n agency interpretation that is ‘incon-
sisten[t] with the design and structure of the statute as a whole . . . does not
merit deference.’ ”191  In dissent, Justice Breyer also argued that a statutory
interpretation should not force workability by functionally changing the
statute, stating, “Nothing in the statutory text, the legislative history, or
common sense suggests that Congress, when it imposed the 250 tons-per-
year threshold, was trying to undermine its own deliberate decision to use
the broad language ‘any air pollutant’ by removing some substances (rather
than some facilities) from the PSD program’s coverage.”192  Justice Breyer
argued the dissent’s interpretation was correct because it complied with the
CAA functionally.  “[G]iven the purposes of the PSD program and the Act
as a whole, as well as the specific roles of the different parts of the statutory
definition, finding flexibility in any source is . . . sensible.”193  These opin-
ions suggest that when an agency interpretation results in drastic changes to
the statute, an agency can, and in some instances should, look to an alterna-
tive construction of the statute to resolve the Problem rather than cling to
its current interpretation.194
190. Id. at 2214.
191. Util. Air Regulatory Grp v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442 (2014) (quotations
omitted).
192. Id. at 2454 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
193. Id. at 2452 (quotations omitted).
194. See id. at 2446 (majority opinion).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Problem occurs when a statute’s provisions become contradictory
or unworkable in the context of new or unforeseen phenomena, yet the
statute mandates agency action.195  The text of the statute may be unambig-
uous, yet its application may be problematic or unclear.  Similarly, unam-
biguous provisions may become inconsistent given a particular application
of the statute.  The Court addressed three variations of the Problem during
the same term in Scialabba and UARG, which this Note characterized as
direct conflict, internal inconsistency, and unworkability.  In these cases,
various definitions of ambiguity were applied.
The broadest definition encompassed “truly” direct conflicts, direct con-
flicts, internal inconsistencies, and unworkability.196  In contrast, the nar-
rowest definition found ambiguity based only on internal inconsistency.197
In some instances, the Court found no ambiguity, but allowed an agency
more interpretive flexibility under Step One in order to resolve the Prob-
lem and accomplish the unambiguous mandate of the statute.  The non-
traditional role of ambiguity in broken statutory frameworks lends new
meaning to the Chevron analysis because it can move a court to Step Two or
provide an agency greater interpretive flexibility under Step One.  But
these two cases show that the Problem does not give an agency boundless
interpretive authority.  Some agency action may be impermissible even
when an agency is faced with the Problem.  Justices disapproved of agency
solutions that altered or ignored unambiguous statutory text, and of solu-
tions that used interpretation to change statutes’ functions.  A review of
these principles alongside other cases where the Court has reviewed agency
interpretations of broken statutory frameworks would help further illumi-
nate the definition of ambiguity and the extent of interpretive flexibility in
addressing the Problem.  In the meantime, agencies should reevaluate the
definition of Chevron ambiguity when interpreting broken statutory
frameworks and be attentive as lower courts attempt to define this develop-
ing area of Chevron review.
195. See Freeman & Spence, supra note 10.
196. See Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014) (Kagan, J., plurality
opinion); see also UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2449 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
197. See Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2216 (Alito, J., dissenting); UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2445
(Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
